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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final Decree of Divorce
entered in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah on January 14, 1992. The Utah Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Rules of
the Utah Court of Appeals and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(g)
(Supplement 1989) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Court abused its discretion by

awarding defendant alimony in the sum of $1,500.00 per month for
the first twelve months from the date of trial and $1,000.00 per
month for three years thereafter, in light of the disparity of
income between the parties, the length of marriage, defendant's
age, lack of specified job training or skills, her financial
needs and economic obligations, including the care of her own
children.
2.

Whether the Court misinterpreted or misapplied the

law as set forth in Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App.
1991) in failing to equalize the parties' standard of living or
opportunities.
3.

Whether the Court abused its discretion in not

allowing defendant to present evidence of her economic needs and
circumstances arising from the primary care of her children from
a prior marriage and in failing to make findings of fact related
to the defendant's financial needs.

2

4.

Whether the Court abused its discretion by

ordering defendant to be responsible for one-half of substantial
marital debts and obligations in light of a significant disparity
between plaintiff and defendant's ability to earn income and to
pay or satisfy such obligations.
5.

Whether the Court abused its discretion by failing

to provide defendant an award or any other consideration for her
premarital equity and in failing to adhere to legal standards
related to the recognition of premarital contributions.
6.

Whether the Court abused its discretion in failing

to award defendant a significant contribution towards reasonable
attorney's fees and court costs in light of the defendant's
inability to pay and the extreme disparity of income between
plaintiff and defendant.
STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(1) (1989).
DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY - MAINTENANCE OF HEALTH CARE OF
PARTIES AND CHILDREN - COURT TO HAVE CONTINUING
JURISDICTION - CUSTODY AND VISITATION - TERMINATION OF
ALIMONY - NON-MERITORIOUS PETITION FOR MODIFICATION.
1.
When a Decree of Divorce is rendered, the Court
may include in it equitable orders relating to the
children, property, and parties . . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Glen Paul Willey, the plaintiff-appellee in this
matter, filed a Complaint for divorce against his wife, Rosalind
Ann Willey, on January 8, 1991.

Mrs. Willey subsequently filed a

counterclaim seeking alimony, a fair and equitable division of
3

property, recognition of a premarital contribution and attorney's
fees.
The case was tried before the Honorable David S. Young
on November 21 and 22, 1991. Each side was represented by
counsel and presented documentary and testimonial evidence.

In

addition, Mr. Willey called as a witness, the Appellant's
employer who presented evidence related to her rate of pay and
lack of benefits. Mrs. Willey called as witnesses a vocational
management expert, her brother-in-law and her counsel.

Following

presentation of the evidence and closing arguments, the trial
court issued its ruling.

Thereafter Findings of Fact Conclusions

of Law and Decree of Divorce were signed and entered on January
14, 1992.
The rulings of the trial court applicable to the issues
on appeal were as follows:
1.

Defendant was awarded alimony in the amount of

$1,500.00 per month for a period of twelve months from the date
of trial. Thereafter, alimony was reduced to $1,000.00 per month
for three years, at which time alimony would terminate.
2.

The Court ordered that the parties' home be sold

and after deducting the costs of sale and all liens, the parties
were to be equally responsible for any remaining deficiencies or
share the remaining equity.
3.

The Court ordered the parties to share equal

responsibility for the payment of plaintiff's loan with First
Interstate Bank in the approximate amount of $11,600.00.
4

4.

The Court denied defendant's request for a

consideration of premarital contribution holding that plaintiff's
premarital property had been co-mingled in subsequent purchases
of marital residence•
5.

Finally, the Court found that Appellant was

capable of earning between $1,500 and $2,000 per month, but
failed to adopt any findings related to her needs or expenses.
The Court further found that appellee could earn $110,000 per
year.
Copies of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree of Divorce are attached hereto in the Addendum as Exhibits
A and B and are, by this reference, incorporated herein.
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal on February
5, 1992.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

Marital History.

The parties were married on April 29, 1982 in Salt Lake
City, Utah; each had been married before.

Defendant, now age 42,

had custody of three minor children from a prior marriage, two of
whom remained minors as of the date of divorce.

Defendant owned

her own home with equity of $29,000, her household furnishings,
an automobile and gifted stocks; prior to her marriage, she was
employed full-time in retail clothing earning approximately
$10,000 per year.

(TR 9 and 212).

Plaintiff, then age 31, had just begun working as a
stockbroker at Kidder Peabody after having been out of work for a
5
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worth $12,200 per year together with travel allowances and
potential bonuses•2
Mrs. Willey worked part-time from 1983 through 1990
earning the following:
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

$ 4,810
5,011
6,871
1,556
1,323
470
0

1990

4,410

Mrs. Willey became a full-time homemaker and mother
until the separation required her to return to full-time work in
1991.

In 1990, Mrs. Willey became employed as a salesperson at A

Women's Place Bookstore earning $5.00 per hour.

She supplemented

her income by leading literary groups formed through her
bookstore.

Mrs. Willey's average income for all years worked was

not greater than $2,809 (Exhibit 34 D) and her gross monthly
income at the time of trial from all sources was $860.

Mrs.

Willey also received $332 as a contribution to child support for
the care of her two minor children.
Both parties have college educations.

Mrs. Willey,

however, has had no vocational training other than her part-time
clothing or book sales jobs, and has no skills which would allow
her to effectively compete in the current job market.
Accordingly, she requested rehabilitative alimony to allow her to
2

Bonus for 1987, receivable in 1992 was $14,212; bonus for
1990 receivable on January 2, 1995 was $11,003; bonus projected
for 1991 receivable in 1996 was $16,219 (TR at 151).
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which was used as a down payment on the purchase of the parties'
present home on Maywood Drive.
According to Appellant's testimony, Mr. Willey always
regarded Mrs. Willey's equity as her separate property and
assured her that he would not and did not treat the original
equity as a marital contribution.

(TR 213-214)

In 1989 at Mr. Willey's request, a second trust deed
was executed as security for earlier borrowings from Mrs.
Willeyfs parents (the Johnson's), for home improvements on the
Lynnwood Drive home as well as some $25,000 borrowed to pay for
the purchase of Mr. Willey's 450 SEL Mercedes.

In order to

deduct the interest payments on his tax returns, the note was
secured by a deed of trust against the parties' Maywood Drive
house.
Appellant argued that the second note dated March 1,
1987 for $25,000 should be considered as a separate marital
obligation which Mr. Willey ought to pay, thus allowing appellant
enough proceeds from the eventual sale of the Maywood Drive home
to reimburse her for her original premarital investment.

The

District Court held that Appellant's subsequent uses of her
premarital equity constituted a co-mingling of her assets and,
after holding that both notes be deducted from the sale proceeds,
since there likely would be no equity after the sale of the home,
it denied her claim for a premarital distribution.
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amounts of money should trading in the stock market produce lean
times.

At one time in 1987, Mr. Willey testified he had over

$100,000 in the bank from numerous sources.

(TR 202)

In 1989, Mr. Willey experienced a comparatively bad
year of production.

That caused marital trouble and some

financial stress, however, not so much that Mr. Willey changed
much of his standard of living.

He continued to spend over $200

per month on a personal body trainer and enjoyed European and
personal trips.

(TR 272).

Following their separation in November 1990, the
parties agreed and the trial court approved a Temporary Order of
Support requiring plaintiff to maintain all of the parties' debts
and obligations including the first mortgage on the home of
approximately $2,600; and, in addition, to pay Mrs. Willey $1,500
per month as temporary support.

The parties attempted to treat

this distribution tax-free to Mrs. Willey by filing joint income
tax returns. (TR 147)
ARGUMENT I
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN LIMITING
APPELLANT'S AMOUNT AND DURATION OF ALIMONY.
The trial court employed the wrong standard to set alimony and
failed to consider or properly apply necessary factors judicially
recognized in analyzing an alimony award.
Those considerations are commonly recited from Jones v.
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985) as follows:
(1) the financial conditions and needs of the recipient
spouse; (2) the ability of the recipient spouse to
produce sufficient income to support herself; and (3)
11
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the following obligations for his wife's support under the
temporary order of support:
Mortgage
Marital installment obligations
Support payments

$2,492
360^
1,500

Total monthly temporary support

$4,352

The District Court's final order continued Appellant's
support at $1,500 per month for only one year but failed to
consider the following additional obligations which Appellant
will be required to pay and satisfy:
1.

Rent of $1,100 per month to replace shelter when

the parties' home is sold;
2.

Health insurance after the date of the Decree of

Divorce in the amount of $560 per month (TR at 169);
3.

Obligations imposed upon Appellant by the Decree

of Divorce to pay one-half of the marital debt which includes an
approximate $11,000 debt to First Interstate Bank payable at $360
per month and whatever deficiency maybe due on the notes to Mrs*
Johnson following the sale of the parties' residence.4
The parties' promissory note payment to Mrs. Johnson in the
amount of $87 0.52 was deferred pending sale of home. Since the
date of trial, the parties house was sold by order of the trial
court, which sale will produce an approximate $37,000 deficiency,
one-half of which appellant must pay under the Decree of Divorce.
The amount due as of November

1, 1991 on both

notes

secured

by a second trust deed on the home totalled $80,759.90 (Ex. 15
D). The parties continue to owe monthly payments of $870.52 and
have missed nine payments since the date of trial to July, 1992
totalling $7,834.68 together with interest thereon at an agreed
12%. The home sold for approximately $305,000 producing a
deficiency of $36,944 calculated as follows:
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total added obligations $1,680.
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i

all of the trappings of people enjoying a high standard of living
and station in the community.
The parties funded this high standard of living through
their earnings (Exhibit 34 D), and maintained it during periods
of income fluctuation through credit made available from the
Appellant's parents, borrowings from the parties1 401(k)
programs, the appellee's employer, banks and other readily
available sources. While the parties incurred debt in order to
maintain this lifestyle, the debt incurred was certainly within
their capacity to pay and was voluntarily incurred by Mr. Willey.
Subsequent to the filing of the Complaint for Divorce,
Appellant was able to maintain a reduced but comfortable standard
of living; she continued to reside in the parties1 home, had use
of $1,500 per month non-taxable support, and remained a dependant
under her husband's health insurance program.

Her children were

not able to continue in private schools, and she was not able to
continue her schooling, take vacations, purchase expensive
clothing or live to the standard previously enjoyed.
After the District Court's final award of alimony, and
after the sale of the parties' residence, she will have available
to her, now subject to tax, her child support of $330 per month,
her net earnings of $664 (Ex. 370) and the ordered alimony.
However, she will also have additional debt burden of $24,000,
and the extra need to fund rent, taxes and health insurance. All
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of these additional burdens will reduce her comparable resources
from $5,346 to $324 per month/
B.

Ability of Spouse to Provide For Her Own Support.

In spite of testimony that Appellant had not worked
full-time in competitive employment for the nine years of
marriage and was averaging only $628 gross per month from her two
jobs (book sales and supplemental literature classes associated
with the bookstore)(TR at 58) the Court found, based upon
Appellant's education and circumstances, that she should be able
to earn between $1,500 and $2,000 per month, recognizing it may
take her "a little bit of time to get to that level", but "should
be there within 12 to 24 months".

(TR of Decision p.8).

Appellant called upon a vocational expert, the Human
Relations Manager of Bonneville Corporation, who testified that a
42 year-old woman with an outdated Bachelor of Arts education who
had not established marketable current skills and had not

Resources Before Divorce
Mortgage
$2 ,492
Debts
360
1 ,500
Support
330
Child Support
664
Earnings
$5,346
Reduced resources by
added burdens:

Resources After Divorce
0
$
0
1 ,500
330
664
$2,494
Rent
1,100
Health Ins.
560
First Interstate
180
Deficiency (24,000) ?
Taxes
330
$2,170

Net available:
Before:

$5,346

After:
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$

324

maintained employment for ten years, needed rehabilitation in
order to upgrade her skills and education, unless she is to be
relegated to unskilled sales or other under-paid positions. The
expert testified that without financial help, Appellant was
likely to become a public charge.

(TR at 127-131).

The expert's

testimony was subjected to cross-examination but not controverted
by competent evidence.

The testimony was, however, completely

discredited by the Trial Judge upon the assumption that it was
given by an "acquaintance" and was therefore manufactured, or
because the expert had intended to charge for her services which
the Court found to be "unfortunate".

(TR at 145-146).7

The Court's finding that Appellant could earn between
$1,500 and $2,000 per month is simply not consistent with her
skills, her actual earnings, her abilities or the evidence and is
based solely upon an assumption and speculation that as a
"presentable woman" (TR 142) she is competent to obtain and
maintain such employment8.
During the two years prior to the trial in this matter,
Appellant worked three to four days per week at $5.00 per hour
and taught approximately five classes per month at nights earning
an average of $628 gross income.

(TR at 58).

In order to earn

Appellant questions the trial court's reasoning, believing
that many men have "acquaintances" in the business world whose
testimony would not be discredited for that reason alone.
Appellee's counsel in cross-examination of Appellant and
her expert, attempted to demonstrate that Mrs. Willey could
qualify as a teacher ($18,000) or sell clothing at Nordstrom
(apparently speculating without evidence that Nordstrom pays
$1,500 to $2,000 per month).
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the $2,000 per month projected by the Trial Court Judge, she
would have to increase her hourly wage from $5.00 to $12,50 per
hour.

Had she been able to work full-time at $5.00 per hour, her

actual earnings would have been $800, less taxes, for net takehome pay of $623.80.
C.

(TR at 62).

Ability of Paying Spouse to Provide Support.

The District Court found, albeit "conservatively" that
Appellee had the financial ability to earn $110,000 exclusive of
other employment benefits paid him.

(TR of decision at p.7).

Appellant's actual earnings are set forth on Exhibit 34 D or
plaintiff's Exhibit 3 P.

The Court apparently made that

calculation by averaging income over the full nine years of the
marriage (TR 184-185) at approximately $90,000 per year and by
taking a six year average between 1987 and 1991 but only using a
year-to-date figure of earned income in 1991 in the amount of
$126,000.

The Court then averaged earnings by excluding the high

year of 1986 in order to support an approximate average of
$110,000.
The actual amount of earned income reported to November
1, 1991 was $126,095 for just the first ten months of that year.
The trial Court expressed confidence that the difference between
its finding of average earnings of $110,000 and the actual ten
month earning of $126,000 is insignificant enough to avoid a
finding of abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals (TR 187).
Yet, that difference of $16,000 for 10 months and almost $30,000
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for annualized income represents more than full year's earned
income which the Court found Appellant capable of earning.
It is uncontroverted that the court's average findings
do not include an additional $12,308 of benefits received by Mr.
Willey, (TR 172) nor do they include the deferred bonus of up to
4% of his production (TR 153).

Accordingly, Appellee has a

significant income earning ability and the clear opportunity to
earn substantially more.
Appellee testified that his own expenses, other than
attorney's fees and installment obligations, were only $2,600 per
month.

This included approximately $800 per month for his leased

450 SEL Mercedes Benz automobile.
The Court's conservative finding of $110,000 gross
earnings would produce monthly income of $9,166.66 per month
subject to taxes. Assuming a 30% withholding for taxes, that
still leaves net income available under the Court's own findings
of $6,416.20 per month.

Following sale of the parties'

residence, Appellee will be relieved of $2,492 per month in house
payments and will only be paying to Appellant $1,500 in tax
deductible alimony payments, leaving him at least $5,000 to
support his $2,400 per month expenses with an additional savings
of some $2,500 per month.

Clearly Appellee has the financial

ability not only to pay the ordered support, but a significant
amount more; he also has the ability to pay all of the parties'
marital debts and obligations.
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Appellant argued below that for similar reasons
expressed by the Court of Appeals in Thronson v. Thronson, 810
P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991), the trial court's use of average
earnings over a long period of time, without giving substantial
weight to actual earnings in the year of divorce constitutes an
abuse of discretion.
An additional effect of the Court's findings will
prohibit applicant from ever seeking adjustment of support based
upon changed circumstances related to Appellee's income. §30-35(3) Utah Code (Ann. 1953 as amended) authorizes retained
jurisdiction to modify support awards where a change of
circumstance has occurred.

When the Court, however, determines

earnings by using a long-term average, the Appellant is deprived
of a significant protection should the paying spouse's earnings
significantly increase.
In February 1991, the parties had reached a stipulation
regarding temporary support based upon Mr. Willey's then
represented annual income of $81,000 for 1990 and Appellant's
income of $500 per month (Ex. R 13).

The Commissioner approved

that stipulated support of $1,500 per month (Ex. R 40) after
argument by Appellee that he actually made $92,000 of income (Ex.
R 23).

The trial court, in the final Decree, approved a

substantially reduced support based upon average income of
$110,000 per year, inspite of the fact that actual earnings were
projected for 1991 at $140,000 per year. This variance between
$81,000 and $140,000 per year constitutes a $60,000 swing in
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annualized earnings.

One would think that would be sufficient to

demonstrate a change of circumstance for future modifications.
For the reasons expressed herein, Appellant believes
that the Court abused its discretion by using a "conservative"
average, by not considering actual earnings, by failing to
consider a substantial benefit package available to Appellee and
not available to the Appellant,and by failing to consider
substantial bonuses.

Having made its decision on Appellee's

earning power, the trial court seemed less than interested in any
evidence demonstrating Mr. Willey's future earning capacity and
opportunities.

(TR at 195).

It is also clear that the trial court (1) failed to
make findings of fact concerning the appellant's needs;
(2) failed to make findings consistent with the evidence
concerning her abilities to contribute to her own needs; and
(3) failed to properly consider the Appellee's significant
ability to generate substantial income.
ARGUMENT II
THE COURT MISAPPLIED THE STANDARD
FOR AN AWARD OF ALIMONY
After examining the three Jones factors, the Utah Court of
Appeals held that alimony be set as permitted to "approximate the
parties' standard of living during the marriage as closely as
possible".
1991).

Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 at 1212 (Utah App.

Alimony need not be limited to provide for only basic

needs, but should also consider the recipient spouses' station in
life.

Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1978), Gardner
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v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988).

Rudman v. Rudman, 812

P.2d 73 (Utah App. 1991).
The factual situation presented in Howell v. Howell was
relatively similar to that presented here. The court in Howell
made specific findings as to the plaintiff's and defendant's
gross incomes.

It did not, however, make the required findings

as to defendant's financial needs, although she testified to
monthly expenses of approximately $5,000.

The court in Howell

was presented with a woman in her 50's having spent most of her
marriage raising and caring for the children of the marriage.
The court stated that the wife's
likelihood of achieving significant salary levels in the
future is slim. The alimony set by the court does not come
close to equalizing the parties' standard of living as of
the time of the divorce, but allows plaintiff a two to four
times advantage. We, therefore, hold that the alimony
amount set by the Court was clearly erroneous.
Ld at 1213.
Appellant here argues that her situation is similar to
that presented not only in Howell but also in Bell v. Bell, 810
P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991).

Both situations present a wife

essentially dependent upon the significant earnings of her
husband during the marriage; she earned little and essentially
stayed at home raising children. While it is true that
Appellant's children are not the natural children of Appellee, it
cannot be ignored that Appellant faces the problem of maintaining
and raising those children as best she can without the children
or herself becoming a public charge.

It is further true that

Appellant is little equipped to compete for high paying jobs and
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is advancing in age. The standard announced by the Court of
Appeals in Howell was an attempt to equalize the parties' postdivorce status in order to better equip both parties to go
forward with their separate lives with relatively equal odds.
The trial court in the matter stated, in discussing the
Howell standard:
. . . if the Court of Appeals directed that that is the
standard, then the Court would be inclined, would obviously
have a compulsion, because of controlling authority, to
follow that. In the five years that I've been on the bench
I have found that almost no case will justify the equalizing
of income. There are circumstances that just simply, and
facts, that just simply compel one to deal otherwise, and
that, as a motivator or as an objective, seems to me to be,
perhaps, in an individual case, something that could be
pursued, for instance, if people had been married for a long
period of time and in their retirement years they determined
to separate, then I could understand that potential. But
when one is as these parties are, where there are
approximately a quarter-century of productive years
remaining, if not more, that is certainly not my reading of
the law nor my desire. I don't think it is appropriate, and
I don't think it is likely in this case. (TR at 381)
The case law appears to adopt differing standards of
alimony based upon the abilities of the paying spouse.

Where the

parties cannot maintain the standard of living enjoyed by them
during the marriage, then the minimum standard must be that
amount which keeps the recipient spouse from becoming a public
charge.

English v, English, 565 P.2d 409, (Utah 1977).

However,

where the joint income of the paying and receiving spouse is
sufficient to approximate their standard of living, the Court
should attempt to set alimony in order to "equalize the parties'
post-divorce status". While that may not mean equal distribution
of available income, it must consider the recipient's overall
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financial needs as well as her practical and actual ability to
contribute to her own support, and the paying spousefs ability to
finance that standard.
The duration of the marriage should not be a
significant controlling factor once it is determined that alimony
is appropriate.

Appellant does not consider nine plus years of

marriage short-term, especially where she provided marital
services to Appellee during the "best years of her life". These
are years which could have been devoted to full-time employment,
and to creating an opportunity to earn significant income.
Instead, the parties chose through their acts, deeds and specific
requests to live for nine years in a marital relationship with
Mrs. Willey assuming the more traditional role of homemaker and
caretaker to her children.

These were the same years when

Appellee's income rose from an average of approximately $57,000
during the first four years of marriage to well over $110,000
during the latter six years of marriage.
It is difficult to tell what, if any, standards the
Trial Court used in analyzing or setting alimony in this matter.
The Court announced that it would not follow the standards set
forth in Howell v. Howell; the Court failed to make findings
related to the Appellantfs financial needs; the Court would not
consider Appellant's obligations towards her natural children,
nor would it reduce income available for her own support by
whatever amount was necessary to meet her legal obligations of
support to her own children; the Court failed to consider how
24

Appellant would make up the deficiency of income over expenses,
requiring Appellant to pay 50% of marital debts and obligations
even though total income available for support was insufficient.
Finally, the trial court denied Appellant's request for
rehabilitative alimony.
App. 1987).

Peterson v. Peterson, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah

In short, the Court's analysis and award of alimony

constituted a clear abuse of discretion.

Jones v. Jones, 700

P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) .
ARGUMENT III
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
APPELLANT'S OBLIGATIONS TO HER NATURAL CHILDREN.
Section 78-45-4.1 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as Amended) clearly
provides that a stepfather has an obligation to support his
stepchildren during the course of a marriage and until that
marriage is terminated by Decree of Divorce.
Yet our courts have not expressed how the natural parent's
obligations toward her children are to be considered in analyzing
her needs for purposes of setting alimony.

Appellant's

uncontroverted testimony is that she requires $5,400 to meet her
expenses including the expenses associated with the care of her
natural children.

She testifies that she receives $330 per month

in child support from the children's natural father.

Appellee

has no further obligation toward child support, but does and
should have an obligation to continue his wife in that standard
enjoyed by the parties during the marriage.

To what extent the

Court can employ a fiction to avoid consideration of Appellant's
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legal obligation of support to her children, has not yet been
clarified by our Courts,
Appellant argues that her obligations to her children
must first be considered by reducing her earned income available
for their support, and by recognizing her increased financial
needs.

Appellant does not argue that certain expenses separately

associated with the care of the children be continued by
Appellee, such as private tuition and certain entertainment
expenses clearly associated with the children's individual needs.
However, to the extent her housing requires more than a onebedroom apartment because she is the custodian of two minor
children, and to the extent that the law obligates Appellant to
provide education, food, clothing and shelter to her children,
those financial obligations must be recognized by the trial court
in fixing an award of alimony to her,
ARGUMENT IV
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REQUIRING EQUAL
APPELLANT TO SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MARITAL DEBT.
For reasons expressed in Arguments I and II above, the trial
court abused its discretion in dividing marital debt, because it
failed to consider either the applicant's ability to pay such
debt or the disparity between Appellant's and Appellee's ability
to earn income or satisfy debt.
The court ordered Appellant to be equally responsible for $11,000
of debt with First Interstate Bank in Mr. Willey's name, inspite
of the fact that much of that debt was incurred by him subsequent
to the parties' separation.

(TR 194 and 307).
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The court further

obligated Appellant to pay one-half of any deficiency on the two
promissory notes due and owing to Mrs. Johnson which notes had
been secured by the marital home.

That debt has since been

established at approximately $37,900.

Appellant received little

if any property settlement that could be used to offset her share
of this substantial debt.
insolvent.

She is technically and practicably

Just as the relative abilities of each spouse may be

important to an equitable distribution of assets, so too, is it
important to a division o;f debt.

Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369

(Utah 1988).
Even Appellee suggested in his proposed resolution of
this matter before the trial judge that he should be responsible
for marital debt recognizing that she will never have the
ability.

(Ex. 49-P, TR 336).
For the reasons expressed in Arguments I and II above,

it was err for the court to impose equal obligations where the
parties1 earning abilities are so substantially disproportionate.
ARGUMENT V
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED
ERROR IN
FAILING TO PROVIDE APPELLANT
CONSIDERATION FOR PREMARITAL ASSETS
Appellant entered into this marriage with a $29,000
equity in her own home and the security of a good job.

She

leaves the marriage with no home, substantial debt and little
ability to provide for her own support and maintenance.
Appellee, on the other hand, began this marriage with no property
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and a reasonable income. He leaves the marriage with substantial
income and comparatively small debt burdens.
In this context, Appellant argued to the trial court
that the court should recognize her premarital contribution in
order to leave her some equity to provide for herself and her
children.

This would have been accomplished had the trial court

recognized that one of the two promissory notes, subsequently
secured by the parties' marital home, be considered the separate
obligation of Mr. Willey, since most of the proceeds were used
for the purchase of his Mercedes automobile and since he, not
she, has the ability to pay and satisfy such notes. This
analysis would have left some equity after the sale of the
parties' home with which to provide Appellant a portion of her
premarital equity.

The trial court found that because Appellant

allowed her equity to be used in the purchase of subsequent
homes, she lost the premarital treatment of such contribution
through co-mingling.

The court, accordingly, denied her claim

inspite of uncontroverted testimony that Mr. Willey had always
treated her contribution as her own separate property, and
inspite of her ability to trace her separate contribution in each
of the subsequent home purchases made by the parties.
Finally, by holding that the two notes owing to Mrs.
Johnson and secured by the home must be paid solely from proceeds
of the home, Appellant lost the opportunity to claim any
recognition for her separate premarital equity into this
marriage.
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Appellant contends that the court erred in apply
Mortenson v. Mortenson, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988) by simply
holding that her consent to use her premarital equity in the
subsequent purchases of homes automatically lost its treatment as
separate property.

The court could have and should have

fashioned a remedy which recognized Appellant's separate
contribution prior to a division of assets or debts. In
Mortenson the court held that property separately acquired by one
spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement of its
value, should be awarded to that spouse unless the property has
been consumed or its identity lost through co-mingling or
exchanges, or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an
interest therein to the other spouse.

370 P.2d at 308. The fact

that Appellant's equity in her premarital home was exchanged for
equity in two other homes is not in and of itself a "co-mingling
or an exchange" which would automatically cause a loss of its
identity.

She is simply exchanging her premarital equity in a

home for subsequent premarital equities. To hold otherwise would
essentially destroy any opportunity for parties to upgrade their
living conditions during subsequent marriages; this would be an
economic absurdity.

Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App.

1990) .
Appellant argues that the only legitimate question left
is whether or not the equity was "consumed" such that there is
nothing to distribute.

It is Appellant's belief that the court

would not consider her arguments to separately treat the Johnson
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notes, not as debt against the home but as personal debt
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ARGUMENT V I
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO AWARD
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for attorney's fees incurred in this appeal.

Bell v. Bell, 810

P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991).
REQUESTED RELIEF AND CONCLUSION
Appellant received as a distribution of property in
this matter her automobile, premarital gifted stock (which her
husband had earlier placed into their I.R.A. account), one-half
of a 401K plan with a net value of $12,000 and furniture and
personal property in her possession.

She also received one-half

of a vested bonus to be received January 2, 1992 in the
approximate gross amount of $8,000.
Neither the I.R.A. nor 401K awards are available to
Appellant without incurring substantial tax payments and
penalties.

(TR 311). Appellant is left with debts, including

unpaid attorney's fees of approximately $38,000, without the
earning capacity to repay any such amounts.
Appellant, on the other hand, received an equal amount
of property and debts but has the earning capacity to satisfy all
such debts and to begin to successfully pursue his future with
substantial income and credit available to him.

Clearly, these

parties are nowhere close to an equalization of opportunity.
Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991),

Appellant

faces bankruptcy while Appellee enjoys a strong financial future.
The court's division of assets, its failure to consider
Appellant's premarital equity, its imposition of debts upon
Appellant without the ability to pay, its failure to recognize
the substantial disparity between the parties' earning
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law and equitable considerations. Appellant also requests an
award of attorney fees and costs incurred for this Appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of August 1992,

By
Roger D. Sandack (2856)
Attorney for Appellant
Rosalind Ann Johnson Willey
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
('n I 11. lMh day of August, 1992, true and correct
copies of the foregoing

BRIEF OK APPELLANT was hand delivered to

the following:
Ellen Maycock, Esq.
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
50 West 300 South, #800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

16007

"
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ADDENDUM

FILES 3SSTS2C7 GGU^T

Third Judicial District

JAN 1 h 1992
SALT L^ECOUNTY
"""""""

Deputy Clerk

ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)531-7090

FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GLEN P. WTLLEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

;
]>

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS rt" r * W

]

ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON
Defendant.

]1

Civil No. 91 490 0101
Judge David S. Young

The above-entitled matter came on for trial on November 21 and 22, 1991.
Plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, Ellen Maycock, and defendant
was present and represented b s '

.. d
arguments

:

.., <

, JU .I* iiz^ *uLy

advised, now makes and enters the following:
Findings of Fact
I-

Residence, Plaintiff a nci defendant were bona i ide residents of Salt I ,ake

County, Utah, for more than three months prior to the filing of this action.
2,

Marriage. Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife having been

married on April 29,1982, in Salt Lake County, Utah.
EXHIBIT "A11

3.

Children. No children have been born as issue of this marriage, and none

are expected.
4.

Grounds for Divorce. During the marriage, irreconcilable differences have

developed between the parties making continuation of their marriage impossible.
Each party is entitled to a decree of divorce from the other party.
5.

Real Property. During the marriage, the parties acquired a house and real

property located at 2605 East Maywood Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. The house
should be sold as soon as feasible because it constitutes a substantial financial burden
for the parties. The house should be listed at a price of $350,000 with a new real
estate agent to be agreed upon by the parties as soon as the present listing agreement
expires. Upon sale of the house, the first mortgage in the approximate amount of
$232,000 to Zions Bank should be paid in full, and the second mortgage in the
approximate amount of $80,000 to Beverly Johnson should be paid in full, together
with all costs of sale. Any net proceeds of the sale then remaining should be divided
as follows:
(a)

If the house is sold within 90 days of the date of November 22, 1991,

all remaining net proceeds of sale should be awarded to defendant.
(b)

If the house is sold after the expiration of 90 days from November 22,

1991, the parties should divide any net proceeds equally.
(c)

In the event that the sales price of the house is not sufficient to pay

the first and second mortgages and costs of sale, the parties shall be equally
responsible for payment of any short fall or deficiency.

-2-

Plaintiff should fnahnaa i,n tn'ik*1 Ilia itrst tiiui tya^a payment until the house is
Payment of the second mortgage shall continue to be deferred. Defendant may
remain in possession of the hou^. uai;" it ; ^!a
6

Automobiles, Ine cut

1988 1 .andcruise*

l

.:

• npf. vai •

:v. payment

ne

? '. - encumbrance ther-.~

$7,000. The Landcruiser -aan ar awarded i<- defendant. The • -m. * an<a~ u-ji
1987 Mercedes hasa- M *• sir:-, t -* *:>i.-v! a
Assume and pa> 1

.„.-.;*

• • .

r«

••«•»-.

• ' defendant Lunulas

uieretrom.

Individual Retirement Account. The individua ^lir^int, :t account In the
name of Rosalind Willey should be divided as follows:
(a)

The stock in A merican Telephone a nci' IVIe^raph should be awarded

to defendant since it was a family gift to her.
lb)

The cash amounts in the individual retirement account should be

divided equally between the par lias
8

"

KilK Plan. The 40IK plan has a net value of approximately $24,000,

which should be divided equally between the parties. Plaintiff should repay the loan
to the 401K plan and should be entitled to the benefit of any innvasr in I hr valaa of
the 401K plan accruail as a rasuit afthe payment, a(' f ha la,in,
9,

Furniture and Personal Property, The furniture in the parties' home

should be awarded to defendant. The furniture acquired by plaintiff after the parties'
separation should be awarded to him,

i (j ons
a

following personal items currently located in the parties' home:
iaj

Oak chair In den;
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.a

awarded the

(b)

Oak table and chairs (presently being stored);

(c)

Plaintiffs books;

(d)

Framed maps in the den;

(e)

Framed birds in the master bedroom;

(f)

Brass bird bookends;

(g)

Carved arctic loon; and

(h)

Butter churn.

Each party should be awarded the other personal property presently in his or her
possession.
10.

J. G. Willey Limited Partnership. Based on the stipulation of the parties,

the court finds that this is a premarital asset of no value and awards it to plaintiff.
11.

Pension Plan. Plaintiff currently has a pension plan with his employer,

Kidder, Peabody & Company. The pension plan should be divided between the
parties pursuant to the Woodward formula as of November 21, 1991, pursuant to a
qualified domestic relations order.
12.

Alimony. The court finds that a reasonable average income to use for

plaintiff in determining alimony to be paid in this matter is $110,000. Because of
plaintiffs employment as a stock broker, his income has fluctuated. In 1987 and
1991, plaintiff had unusually good income years. The court further finds t h a t
defendant is capable of earning an income of between $1,500 and $2,000 per month,
based on her education and qualifications. Accordingly, the court finds that it is
equitable that plaintiff pay alimony to defendant of $1,500 per month for one year
from the date of trial herein, and $1,000 per month for three years thereafter. The
court further finds that plaintiff has been supporting defendant during the parties'
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separation of approximately one yea r, and it is appropriate to take t
into. anjMii.l, in il" k'nnmmi; ilie ttMin ol aliniony. Alimony shall terminate at the enc
of four years from the date of trial, or when defendant remarries, cohabits with a
member of the opposite sex, or dies, whichever first occurs
13.

Decree of

UIMUTI*

The iinavt> ml uliuiice

-

:

•

nal noon

January 1, 1992.
14,

Deferred Compensation and Bonuses. The o>\ - fir.d.* v- ;i b-j^ed ' ~ -v rk

already performed
(j n Li t i e d In ;i bom,

-

' :T.- ;
.<

. \.\

*,

A

.:..
i\:J.

•

;•

] ; (1 ,.,;,. ,

.

« :: 0* i\\i<

equally between ir.e parties. The e <>±r r.,rr?:» r \"-iuv, "-i.i : /
plaintiff is entitled to be paid in 1995 n n : :!it.^
a re contingent oi

.;
.r

'*
:

'

-

.

is

n o u . d ')<: C*\l(h

,

w

hi n u ^ s , who h

*.;.*.
. v. .: r\ -ider, ;\:a;,> « v .•*

Company. Accordingly, if plaintiff it -xiu employed by Kidder P ^ o ^ d y & Cm-par.•
and receives thot« b. nus >\ the amount
between th*» n ^ r t i ^ .

Tim emn't

... «: ,* :,.

4

:n«,se bonuses >h*u.;.: ^ :<:\ ••;•••:

\I>"UM,T I'M ids

|,

.uany

that plain! itV.:, deferred compensation

ongoing expenses and should not otherwise be divided be

the parties. Each party shall be responsible for the payment of taxes on the portion of
the bonuses distributed to that party.
15

Claim of Premarital Contribution.

Defendant asserted a claim, in this

matter that she made a premarital contribution to the marriage of approximately
$29,000, consisting of the equity •
prior

the mar

h "

. v:

i Logan Avenue
" the sale of the

Logan Avenup h. ,

their

u •::• owned bwv •* • c a v i

;o commingled with other funds of the parties by

"--

-:•' ; .-i-p:-. o
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\ ' : . . l c -i~ premarital property.

Accordingly, the court makes no award as a result of the claimed premarital
contribution.
16.

Joint Tax Return. The parties shall file a joint income tax return for 1991

and divide any refunds to be received equally. In the event that taxes are due, the
parties shall each pay one-half of any taxes.
17.

Medical Expenses of Defendant.

Defendant underwent surgery in

September of 1991. The medical expenses incurred in connection with that surgery
have been submitted for payment to plaintiffs health insurance provider. Any of
those expenses not paid by insurance should be paid from plaintiffs Complus Plan
insofar as there are sufficient funds in the plan to do so. In the event that the
Complus Plan does not cover all of those medical expenses, plaintiff should be
responsible for payment.
18.

First Interstate Advance Line.

During the marriage, plaintiff and

defendant had a credit line with First Interstate Bank. The court finds that the credit
line was incurred to cover family expenses. Each party should pay one-half of the
amount due on the credit line as of November 21,1991.
19.

Other Debts and Obligations. Any debts and obligations incurred by the

parties since their separation should be paid by the party who incurred them. The
court finds that defendant is not entitled to be reimbursed for tuition incurred by her
for Spring Quarter of 1991.
20.

Obligation of Blake J o h n s o n .

Blake J o h n s o n owes the p a r t i e s

approximately $2,000 which he pays to them at the rate of approximately $100 per
month. Defendant should be entitled to receive the payments from Blake Johnson.
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- l...-.
22.

* i^t- i; the parties.

defendant's n*ti»r* .•-'3 fe» and
z- * '

•< :? • U;*M \>ward

Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Plaintiff has pr^-iYi:.-

'

! j

.

••*.'•
;. - v\; 0 c, 1 ,ion ^ a r i v

-

>ward

diu*.., -; p,i\ ni^ *r h e r A V : c o s t s

and fees incurred herein.
From the foregoing findings of fact, the court now makes an enters III •

Conclusions of Law
1

Each party should be awarded a decree of divorce from the other party, to

become final
2

r

. personal property of the parties should be awarded as set

forth in paragraphs 5 *s
3.

''

•"::( ~4

v

* ?• i • • < 1 mn 20 of the findings of fact herein.
aid enter

o
.jaragrapi

- - ^> iindings « 1 ia,r

herein.
4

Plaintiff should M - r.^-t^j n pay alimony to defendant as

n

paragraph \
-

. .- *

plaintiil :n. • ".rjh Kidder, Peabody & Company in 1992,

1995, and 1996, should be divided betweeii the parties as set forth in paragraph 14 of
the findings of fact herein Plaintiffs deferred compen sal inn for 1*391 ahuiild U- used
to pay the nngoing expense,) and shnii Id not otherwise be divided by the parties. Each
party should be ordered to pay the taxes due on the portion of the bonuses distributed
to that party.
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6.

Defendant is not entitled to an award of a premarital contribution in the

amount of $29,000, as set forth in paragraph 15 of the findings of fact herein.
7.

The parties should file a joint income tax return for 1991 and should be

ordered to divide any refunds to be received equally. The parties should each be
ordered to pay one-half of any taxes.
8.

Any of defendant's surgery expenses not paid by insurance should be paid

from plaintiff's Complus Plan, insofar as there are sufficient funds in the plan to do
so. In the event that the Complus Plan does not cover all of those medical expenses,
plaintiff should be responsible for payment.
9.

The parties should be ordered to pay the debts and obligations incurred

during the marriage as set forth in paragraphs 18,19, and 20.
10.

The state income tax refund for 1990 should be awarded equally between

the parties.
11.

Plaintiff should be ordered to pay an additional $3,500 toward defendant's

attorney's fees. Otherwise, each party should be ordered to pay his or her own costs
and fees incurred herein.
DATED this / V ^ a T o f January, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

J U D G E D A V I D S . Y/01JNG
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be delivered to the
following, this 30th day of December, 1991:
Roger D. Sandack, Esq.
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Third Judicial District

JAN 1 * 1992

E L L E N MAYCOCK - 2131
K R U S E , LANDA & MAYCOCK
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)531-7090
IN THE THIRD J U D I C I A L DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GLEN P. WILLEY,

)

Plaintiff,

)

D E C R E E OF DIVORCE

)

I ~ \ 5 " ^ &~
O ^
Civil No. 91 490 0101
Judge David S. Young

ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLEY,
Defendant.

> amass

)
)

The above-entitled matter came on for trial on November 21 and 22, 1991.
Plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, Ellen Maycock, and defendant
was present and represented by her counsel, Roger Sandack. The court having heard
testimony, received exhibits, heard the arguments of counsel, and being fully
advised, and having made and entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law,
NOW, T H E R E F O R E , IT IS HEREBY O R D E R E D , A D J U D G E D , AND
DECREED:
1.

Decree of Divorce, Plaintiff Glen P. Willey is hereby awarded a decree

of divorce from defendant Rosalind Ann Johnson Willey, and defendant Rosalind Ann
Johnson Willey is hereby awarded a decree of divorce from plaintiff Glen P. Willey,
EXHIBIT " B "

on grounds of irreconcilable differences, such decree to become final on J a n u a r y 1,
1992.
2.

Real P r o p e r t y .

The house and real property located at 2605 E a s t

Maywood Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah is ordered to be sold as soon as feasible. The
house shall be listed at a price of $350,000 with a new real estate agent to be agreed
upon by the parties, as soon as the present listing agreement expires. Upon sale of
the house, the first mortgage in the approximate amount of $232,000 to Zions Bank is
ordered to be paid in full, and the second mortgage in the approximate amount of
$80,000 to Beverly Johnson is ordered to be paid in full, together with all costs of sale.
Any net proceeds of the sale then remaining are ordered to be divided as follows:
(a)

If the house is sold within 90 days of the date of November 22, 1991,

all remaining net proceeds of sale are awarded to defendant.
(b)

If the house is sold after the expiration of 90 days from November 22,

1991, the parties are ordered to divide any net proceeds equally.
(c)

In the event that the sales price of the house is not sufficient to pay

the first and second mortgages and costs of sale, the parties are ordered to be
equally responsible for payment of any short fall or deficiency.
Plaintiff is ordered to continue to make the first mortgage payment until the
house is sold. Payment of the second mortgage shall continue to be deferred.
Defendant may remain in possession of the house until it is sold.
3.

Automobiles. The Landcruiser is awarded to defendant.

Plaintiff is

ordered to assume and pay the lease payments on the 1987 Mercedes, and hold
defendant harmless therefrom.
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4.

Individual Retirement A c c o u n t The individual retirement account in

the name of Rosalind Willey is ordered to be divided as follows:
(a)

The stock in American Telephone and Telegraph is awarded to

defendant since it was a family gift to her.
(b)

The cash amounts in the individual retirement account are ordered

to be divided equally between the parties.
5.

401K Plan. The 40 IK plan having a net value of approximately $24,000

is ordered to be divided equally between the parties. Plaintiff is ordered to repay the
loan to the 40IK plan and is awarded the benefit of any increase in the value of the
40 IK plan accrued as a result of the payment of the loan.
6.

F u r n i t u r e and P e r s o n a l Property. The furniture in the parties' home

is awarded to defendant.

The furniture acquired by plaintiff since the parties'

separation is awarded to him, and he is ordered to assume and pay any obligations
incurred in connection therewith. In addition, plaintiff is awarded the following
personal items currently located in the parties' home:
(a)

Oak chair in den;

(b)

Oak table and chairs (presently being stored);

(c)

Plaintiffs books;

(d)

Framed maps in the den;

(e)

Framed birds in the master bedroom;

(f)

Brass bird bookends;

(g)

Carved arctic loon; and

(h)

Butter churn.

Each party is awarded the other personal property presently in his or her possession.
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7.

J . G. Willey Limited P a r t n e r s h i p , The J. G. Willey Limited Partnership

is awarded to plaintiff.
8.

P e n s i o n Plan. The pension plan with Kidder, Peabody & Company is

ordered to be divided between the parties pursuant to the Woodward formula as of
November 21,1991, pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order.
9.

Alimony. Plaintiff is ordered to pay alimony to defendant in the amount

of $1,500 per month for one year from the date of trial herein, and $1,000 per month
for three years thereafter. Alimony shall terminate at the end of four years from the
date of trial, or when defendant remarries, cohabits with a member of the opposite
sex, or dies, whichever first occurs.
10.

Deferred C o m p e n s a t i o n and B o n u s e s .

The amount of the bonus

plaintiff is entitled to in January of 1992 as a result of his employment with Kidder,
Peabody & Company is ordered to be divided equally between the parties. Any future
bonuses which plaintiff is entitled to be paid in 1995 and 1996, and which have been
earned as of this time and are contingent only upon plaintiffs continued employment
with Kidder, Peabody & Company, are ordered to be divided equally between the
parties. Plaintiffs deferred compensation for 1991 is ordered to be used to pay
ongoing expenses and shall not otherwise be divided be the parties. Each party is
ordered to pay the taxes on the portion of the bonuses distributed to that party.
11.

J o i n t Tax Return. The parties are ordered to file a joint income tax

return for 1991 and divide any refunds to be received equally. In the event that taxes
are due, the parties are ordered to each pay one-half of any taxes.
12.

Medical E x p e n s e s of Defendant. Any medical expenses incurred by

defendant in connection with her surgery in September of 1991 which have not been
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paid by plaintiffs health insurance provider shall be paid from plaintiffs Complus
Plan, insofar as there are sufficient funds in the plan to do so. In the event that the
Complus Plan does not cover all of those medical expenses, plaintiff is ordered to be
responsible for payment.
13.

First Interstate Advance Line, Each party is ordered to pay one-half of

the amount due on the credit line with First Interstate Bank as of November 21,
1991.
14.

O t h e r Debts and Obligations. Any debts and obligations incurred by

the parties since their separation are ordered to be paid by the party who incurred
them.
15.

Obligation of Blake J o h n s o n . Defendant is awarded the obligation

from Blake Johnson of $2,000, which he pays at the rate of approximately $100 per
month.
16.

State Tax Refund for 1990. The state income tax refund for 1990 is

ordered to be divided equally between the parties.
17.

A t t o r n e y s ' Fees and Costs. Plaintiff is ordered to pay an additional

$3,500 toward defendant's attorney's fees. Otherwise, each party is ordered to pay his
or her own costs and fees incurred herein.
DATED this ML day of January, 1992.
BY THE COURT:
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